In elevating cost containment to a first principle, the current political debate about health policy in the U.S. and Canada has lost sight ofwhat should be its primary concern: the health status of the population. The two need not be incompatible. Many current medical procedures are ofuncertain value for health and entail sizable costs. The application of the knowledge obtained through randomized clinical trials to the practice ofmedicine can improvepublic health and at the same time save money for needed health purposes.
Introduction
It is an honor to be invited to present the Academic Lecture to the Ontario Psychiatric Association. Because the theme of this annual meeting is the delivery of psychiatric health care services, I have chosen to address issues on health care which have no national boundaries. In doing so, I will necessarily draw most heavily on the U.S. experience because that is what I know best; where I know of comparative data for Canada, I will refer to it. I will address barriers to health care rather than psychiatric care, because the difficulties in psychiatry are a subset of the larger ones. I begin with financial considerations, because governments appear to have succeeded in persuading their peoples that cost is the major issue. Is this true?
Equity
The topic I have chosen to address -barriers to health care -is currently out of fashion. Two decades ago, it was a matter of high concern to citizens in both our countries; that concern led to the passage of legislation intended to remove financial barriers to care, in Canada by universal entitlement through Canadian Medicare (1) and in the U.S. by patchwork coverage for groups at economic risk through U.S. Medicaid and Medicare (2) .
Today, belief is widespread that equity has been attained, even though there is abundant evidence to the contrary (3) . Public focus is on the cost of care. Rising costs are attributed to over-use by the "worried well" and the "non-sick," who are thought to abuse the system because it is free at the point of entry. Having to pay, it is contended, will discourage free-loaders. These legions abusing medical care must be the very same people that Ed Meese, President Reagan's counsel, imagines are lining up outside soup kitchens for a delicious free meal of beans and watery soup!
Costs of Care
Weare told we face a "health care crisis" and many believe it. Yet, this debate about the crisis in health care has little to say about health and much to say about cost. In the United States, total health expenditures for 1982 amounted to $322 billion, 10 .5% of the gross national product (4) . What troubles our politicians is not so much the aggregate cost as the part of it provided by federal funds (in contrast to the charges against private insurance and direct patient payments). In 1982 in the U.S., federal sources accounted for 34% and state sources for 9% of health care expenditures (4) . That it is the governmental portion rather than the total cost which vexes officials is evident in the initiatives ofthe Reagan administration, all of which are based on "capping" federal dollars for Medicare and Medicaid programs despite the resulting increase in out-of-pocket payments for those patients least able to bear them.
If the aggregate cost of care were the problem, one might expect that Canada which expends about 8% of GNP and the United Kingdom almost 6% of GNP, would be less agitated than we are; such is clearly not the case. In both countries, despite per capita expenditures significantly lower than those for the U.S., the part of the total paid from tax funds is considerably higher, precisely because of more comprehensive coverage by Canadian Medicare and by the U.K. National Health Service. In both countries, the strategies under discussion favor shifting the burden to the consumer by allowing overcharges and user fees in Canada and by fostering the growth of private insurance and fee-for-service practice in the UK (5) .
Crises as Social Constructions
As Carroll Estes (6) has pointed out: "crises are socially constructed." They result from social definition, that is, "a crisis may be said to exist if it is perceived to exist." When such definitions are widely shared, they become part of "the collective stock of knowledge." The term crisis implies that the condition so described is different from conventional domestic problems; in particular, it is regarded as having been created by circumstances beyond the control of national leaders. The crisis designation legitimizes the rejection of previously shared assumptions; it provides an impetus to "do something" and affords public officials expanded authority to act in ways that would ordinarily be strongly resisted.
The definition of a problem sharply circumscribes the solutions deemed relevant to that problem. Consequently, it is essential at the outset to distinguish health policy from fiscal policy, even though each has implications for the other. What now preoccupies politicians is cost, not health. Therefore, debate about the costs ofcare should properly take place in the context of debate about overall fiscal policy. Otherwise, we will continue to be confronted by efforts to solve the problem of budgetary deficits at the expense of public health. President Reagan's initial proposals for the 1985 U.S. federal budget include cuts in spending for childhood immunizations, for the treatment of venereal disease and for the medical care of those exposed to toxic wastes (7) . Yet, the immunization of children remains incomplete at a time when vaccine costs are rising, sexually transmitted diseases (particularly herpes) continue to be a national problem and the U.S. is just beginning to come to grips with the health risks from hazardous waste sites.
Ifany are tempted to believe that such draconian measures, though regrettable, are unavoidable because the U.S. anticipates annual federal deficits of$190 billion (8), let us put the problem of cost savings in perspective. The United States Navy (9) has been paying $1,800 for a cardboard hood for the bomb sight on its A-6 jet when the price should have been $60, $381 for a rubber device on a torpedo which is available for $7.50, and $780 for a specialized screwdriver which is worth about $1.80! Here, I suggest, is a splendid opportunity for savings! Compare health care costs and what they buy to what are euphemistically termed "defense" costs and what they threaten to buy. The U.S. Secretary of Defense has proposed spending $2.2. trillion over the next six years (10), at a rate more than three times larger than federal expenditures on health, even before the proposed cuts.
Fiscal Policy vs Health Policy
What must be emphasized is that the deficits in the U.S. budget result from decline in national productivity, cuts in personal and corporate income taxes (with benefits skewed toward those with upper incomes) and decisions taken on military expenditures. This is not the place for a detailed critique of the U.S. budget, let alone the Canadian budget, because these are matters on which I can claim no more expertise than any ordinary citizen. I insist that only health care costs must be considered in the context of general economic policy. As physicians, it is our task to highlight health outcomes, rather than fiscal consequences, as the guiding principle of health policy.
Of course, the costs of care cannot be disregarded. So long as resources are finite, and they clearly are, money wasted is an opportunity lost to improve health care. Nonetheless, the key tasks of national health policy are: a) to eliminate persisting morbidity and mortality which we have the means to prevent and remedy and; b) to provide the resources for research to augment present means. Where disease control and cost control coincide is in reducing expenditures for medical practices, which are useless or even harmful. Although it is cost that preoccupies national attention, I will begin with an account of ways to improve health, some of which may also cut costs.
Variations in Medical Practices
Wennberg et al. (11) have documented striking variations in rates for surgical procedures among small geographic areas with comparable populations. In a survey of the New England states, rates for tonsillectomy were found to vary seven-fold and those for hysterectomy and prostatectomy four-fold from one area to another. The investigators concluded: "the amount and cost of hospital treatment in a community have more to do with the number of physicians there, their medical specialties and the procedures they prefer than with the health of the residents." By now, many people are familiar with the remarkable parallel between the number of surgeons in relation to population and the rates for operative procedures across countries; both figures are about twice as high for the U.S. as for the U.K., with Canada about halfway between the two (12) . That, however, does not tell us whether the U.S. is oversupplied, the U.K. undersupplied, or Canada about right.
The problem is not only the pecuniary interest of physicians working in a fee-for-service system. In a comparison among Norway, the U.K., and the New England States, surgical rates showed similar variability within each country despite the differences in total rates and in the methods of organizing and financing medical care among them (13) . These findings contrast with relatively small variations in rates for appendectomy, generally regarded as the only acceptable treatment for a presumptive diagnosis of appendicitis. Thus, in addition to the role of financial incentives as determinants of medical decisions, there is evidence that medical "fashion" is an important influence. When judgements must be made in the absence of persuasive evidence about which treatment yields the best results, physicians respond to local custom and, perhaps also, to local patient expectations. Vayda and Mindell (14) have reported similar findings for Canada. Variations in age-and sex-standardized surgical rates per 100,000 population in Ontario counties in 1977 ranged from more than two-fold for cholecystectomy to almost ten-fold for colectomy. The investigators found no evidence that differing operative rates reflected differences in disease prevalence. That there are differences between surgeons is evident, not only from area variations, but also from second opinion studies which have found that about one-quarter of patients for whom surgery is recommended by one surgeon have that opinion reversed by a second (15) . At stake is much more than cost. If U.K. rates for the seven common operations examined by Wennberg and his colleagues had applied to the U.S., deaths associated with surgery would have decreased by a third to a half (16) .
Effects of Data Feedback on Physician Behavior
What options are there to change this unsatisfactory state of affairs? In 1972, the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Saskatchewan appointed a study committee in response to the finding that the annual number of hysterectomies in the province had increased at a rate ten times greater than the increase in the number of adult women in the population during the study period. As the result of stipulating approved indications for hysterectomy, the number performed in the province dropped by one-third during a four year period (17) . In similar fashion, Winnberg et al. (\8) found that the feedback of information to the Vermont State Medical Society on disproportions in the number of tonsillectomies was associated with a significant red uction in state-wide rates.
Yet these steps, laudable as they are, do no more than reify expert opinion. That opinion can be no better than the quality of the evidence on which it is based; for many medical and surgical procedures the available data is at best equivocal. As Vayda and Mindell point out, (14) , "the issue of necessary versus unnecessary surgery will not be resolved until the question of efficacy or effectiveness of competing treatments (or treatment versus nontreatment) is answered." What is called for is: first, systematic collation of existing information from properly controlled studies; and second, randomized clinical trials to evaluate treatments of uncertain efficacy.
Evaluating Health Outcomes
The recently completed Coronary Artery Surgery Study, organized by the National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute, provides a case in point (19, 20) . Seven hundred and eighty patients with stable ischemic heart disease deemed eligible for coronary artery bypass grafts were assigned randomly to medical or surgical treatment. The outcome, at a mean of 5.Y2 years, revealed no statistically significant benefit in survival from surgical as compared with medical treatment. Furthermore, although the surgically treated patients did have less chest pain, less limitation of activity and better performance on graded exercise tests, all arguing for a better quality of life, there was in fact no significant difference between the two groups on employment status or recreational status. The investigators concluded: "We believe that patients who are asymptomatic after infarction or who have mild chronic stable angina should be managed initially with appropriate medical therapy to prevent or control ischemic symptoms." Patients "can safely defer bypass surgery until symptoms worsen to the point that surgical palliation is required."
How important are these findings? In 1981, approximately 160,000 by-pass procedures were carried out, making it the most commonly performed major operation in the U.S. At an estimated cost of about $20,000 for each, $3.2 billion was expended, an estimate which does not include the substantial costs of screening and selecting for surgery by cardiac catheterization and coronary angiography (20) . If these data are incorporated into medical decision-making, they can lead to a significant reduction in the use of a costly intervention, despite the fact that by-pass remains the procedure of choice for severe obstruction of the left main coronary artery, for angina persisting after intensive medical management, and for patients with angina who cannot comply with appropriate medical regimens (20) .
Unnecessary and unduly prolonged hospitalizations result in serious health risks, notably nosocomial infections (21) and iatrogenic disease (22) , as well as sizable economic consequences. In one study of 815 consecutive patients on a general medical service of a university hospital (23), 36% experienced an iatrogenic illness, most instances arising from drugs or invasive procedures. In 9% of all patients admitted, a major untoward incident occurred; in 2%, it was thought to have been a contributing factor in the patient's death! Outpatient care in the U.S. is beset by similarly unwarranted and costly medical practices, reinforced by the perverse system ofreimbursement which rewards procedures with far higher fees than those for time spent in clinical assessment. A gastroenterologist realizes a net hourly income from endoscopy which is more than six times greater than from the general management of the patient's illness (24) . The disproportion between the fees paid for procedures and those for a thorough history and physical examination is transforming gastroenterologists into endoscopists (25) and cardiologists into "catheterologists" (26) . The wrong-headed ness ofthis system is indicated by a British study (27) of the relative contributions of the history, the physical examination, and laboratory investigations to the diagnosis and management of medical outpatients.
On 80 newly referred clinic patients, participating physicians recorded a tentative diagnosis after taking the history, reassessed it after the physical examination and. again, after laboratory findings were in. A diagnosis in accord with the final diagnosis was established in 82% of the cases by the history alone and in a further 9% after the physical examination had been performed. In only 7 of the 80 patients did the laboratory findings change the diagnosis based on history and physical. Although 24% of the tests ordered yielded abnormal results, in most cases they served only to confirm the clinical diagnosis. The inference is clear: listening to patients is not only therapeutic, but cost-effective, as well! Is Better Health compatible with Lower Cost?
What conclusions do I draw? First, that rationalizing the delivery of medical and surgical care by the systematic evaluation of health outcomes will improve the quality of that care. Second, that at the same time, keying payment to quality and reversing the emphasis on technology could save tens of billions of dollars on the U.S. health care bill. Such funds would go a considerable distance toward providing coverage for the 26 million Americans who have no health insurance and the millions more who are under-insured (28) . They could be applied to removingdiscriminatory financial barriers to psychiatric care; in the United States, even when psychiatric coverage is included as an insurance benefit, it is restricted to a specified number of outpatient visits and inpatient days. Yet, there is some evidence that providing psychiatric care in health plans results in an "offset", that is, a reduction in the use of general medical services by those patients (29) .
Nonetheless, anticipated savings should be regarded as quite secondary to anticipated health benefits. If my position seems unrealistic, please consider the policy implications of giving precedence to cost. Prevention has become sexy in Ottawa (30) and in Washington (31) because of the hope it will contain health costs. The case is fairly convincing in costing out the benefits of polio, rubella, measles and pertussis vaccination against the costs of treating victims (32) . However, if the financial bottom line is allowed to be decisive, what stand do we take when cost-effectiveness analysis indicates that it will cost $1,000 additional for each year of healthy life gained by vaccinating those 65 years and older against pneumoccal pneumonia and $500additional for the same benefit from influenza vaccine (32) ? If savings are to be the criterion, what policy conclusions shall we draw from the evidence that prolonging life will increase health care costs (33) because of the greater long-run burden of infirmity among the elderly? Surely, it violates the basic principles of the social contract in a democratic society for beneficial health care to be denied on financial grounds.
Conceptual Barriers to Care
I have begun my account to the barriers to care with the financial aspects. I now turn to the conceptual barriers, that is, professional ideologies which disable physicians in meeting patient needs.
Medical vision has come to be dominated by an image of disease as stemming from errors in the body machinery rather than by a more comprehensive view of the patient as a person in distress. The model of disease from which the doctor works shapes the approach to the patient, the questions asked, the tests ordered, and the criteria by which the outcomes of the transaction is judged. In most disorders, there is an evident discrepancy between the extent of the structural abnormalities detected, the discomfort experienced by the patient, and the degree to which function is impaired. The clinical reality of medical practice cannot be encompassed by disease models restricted to biologic phenomena (34) . It is necessary to enlarge our medical horizons to include the patient's experience of illness as well as disease pathophysiology (35) .
Disease vs. Illness
To highlight the difference between the viewpoints of doctor and patient, it is helpful to distinguish between "disease" and "illness", terms synonymous in everyday usage. Diseases, in the biomedical model, are abnormalities in the structure and function of body organs and systems; illnesses, in the patient's world, are experiences of disvalued changes in state of being and in social function (35) . Disease and illness so defined are not in one-toone correspondence. Similar degrees of organ pathology can generate quite different reports of distress. At the other end of the spectrum of office practice, a substantial fraction of patients who consult physicians with complaints of illness have no ascertainable biological basis for their disorder. This leads to a confusion of tongues between patient and physician. The patient knows he feels ill; he is further distressed when the physician tells him "there is nothing wrong." What the physician means is that he can discover no organ pathology, yet there is clearly something wrong for the patient. The error lies in the narrow scope of medical vision (36) .
The patient's focus on experienced discomfort can lead to the opposite error. Consider, for example, the asymptomatic patient who has come in for a periodic physical examination. The doctor discovers elevated diastolic blood pressure. Because effective treatment of hypertension markedly reduces its cardiovascular complications, the doctor places the patient on medication. The patient, who had entered the office feeling well, may now experience fatigue, depression and loss of libido. For the first time, he feels ill, even though his disease may be considerably improved. Change of dose or drug may reduce side effects. Yet, in mitigated form, they may be the unavoidable price for a treatment that will produce long term benefit. The patient may fail to adhere to the regimen because he does not accept the reality of disease in the absence of illness. Only when the hypertension produces heart failure or stroke and the patient is disabled are physician and patient in agreement; by then, it is too late for optimal results. This account of the poor fit between vantage points of doctor and patient is oversimplified. In the real world of medical care, lay concepts of illness and medical concepts of disease interpenetrate and influence each other. Medical beliefs become incorporated into the general culture; folk beliefs may receive implicit sanction from clinicians (37) . Nonetheless, the distinction between disease and illness is a heuristic device to sensitize clinicans. to the limitations of the biomedical model of disease.
Technology and its Consequences
Although its philosophical origins can be traced to Cartesian dualism, the biomedical model has had its major impact on clinical practice since World War II. The accelerating productivity of medical research and the growth of subspecialization in response to it resulted in a gradual narrowing of medical vision to the biologic mechanism of disease. To ascribe this process to the perversity or insensitivity of physicians is to mistake consequence for cause. On the contrary, the narrow focus is best understood as a side effect ofthe technological revolution that has in other ways been of enormous benefit to health care. It would be absurd to abandon its promise (38) . The "old-fashioned family doctor" mayor may not have been kindly, but he was simply incompetent in the face of life threatening disease. The challenge is to add a macroscopic perspective to the microscopic viewin order to enable us to attend to the patient as well as to the disease.
For most of this period, psychiatry remained one ofthe few specialties with a persisting concern for the patient as a person in the era of organ-oriented medicine. Was this because we psychiatrists are inherently more compas-. sionate or humane than our medical colleagues? It would be flattering to believe that is so. The reasons are more prosaic; they are to be found in the nature of the problems we deal with and the state of our art.
The psychiatric patient draws our attention to the issues of the core of human experience. The presenting symptoms are disturbances in feeling, thought and behavior. The illness disrupts the continuity of the self. The manifestations of mental disorder are embedded in the nexus of culture and family. Our effort to understand the idiosyncratic meanings of the perplexing metaphors the patient employs, involves us in reconstructing their antecedents and tracing their consequents. Our success in relieving discomfort occurs in the context of an intense doctor/ patient relationship which becomes itself a major object of study.
Our methods, until the very recent past, have neither been enhanced by, nor encumbered by technology. At the turn of the century, two exciting and disparate developments had promised to clarify the nature of mental disorders. On the one hand, the brilliant successes oflaboratory science in unravelling the occult core of general paresis promised similar discoveries for the other psychoses; on the other, psychoanalytic psychology provided meaning for mental symptoms and proposed that they were best understood as the result of deviations in development. When dementia praecox and manic-depressive psychosis remained impervious to laboratory investigations, disenchantment with premature claims led to a virtual abandonment of the search for brain lesions. Depth psychology, although it boasted only limited success in the treatment of psychosis, provided a rationale for understanding psychopathology and proved useful in the ambulatory care of neurotic patients. Diagnosis and classification remained almost irrelevant to clinical practice because psychotherapy, the principal method of treatment, dealt with personal issues rather than syndromes or diseases.
Thus, psychiatry can be said to have made a virtue of the failure of biomedical science to discover effective means of diagnosis or treatment. If internists learned to focus on organ pathology because it provided the basis for the design of specific remedies, psychiatrists continued to listen to their patients and to focus on social interactions because that is what enabled them to diminish suffering. The ideologies of both specialties had been determined pragmatically.
Yet, at the very moment when the rest of medicine is being pressed to expand its horizons to include psychosocial processes (39) , research findings are steering psychiatry back to the biomedical mainstream. These developments carry with them promise and peril: the promise of greater therapeutic potency and the peril of the reification of disease which has accompanied progress in the other medical specialties.
The Promise and Peril of Progress
In the 1950's,a startling series of chance discoveries set the stage for remarkable changes in the treatment of the psychoses (40) . The new therapeutic armamentarium has had major consequences for psychiatric practice and theory. It provided a means of aborting acute psychotic episodes and of minimizing. recurrences; it reawakened the study of brain biochemistry. Because the new agents were relatively disease specific, diagnosis and classification now became important clinical issues for effective care. All of this has had an exhilarating effect on the science of psychiatry.
In what sense does this enormous promise also embody peril? The peril is that psychiatry may come to focus exclusively on the brain as an organ and to overlook the. experience of the patient as a person. We have been for so long pilloried by our more "scientific" colleagues as witch doctors that it is tempting to seek professional respectability by proclaiming our adherence to a reductionistic model of mental disorder. We may trade the onesidedness of the "brainless" psychiatry of the past for that of a "mindless" psychiatry of the future.
One indication of this phenomenon is the escalating use of the dexamethasone suppression test (DST) in clinical practice in a premature effort to "objectify" psychiatric diagnosis. The DST is being employed to "diagnose" depression and to "predict" treatment response. Yet the most recent expert review (41) of the available evidence indicates: first, that the DST has low sensitivity (it is abnormal in only about 40% of patients with major depression by DSM criteria); second, that it has poor specificity (abnormal test results are found in patients with borderline personality disorder and obsessivecompulsive disorder); third, that the relationship between DST status and treatment responsiveness has yet to be established; fourth, that false positives are obtained in such conditions as diabetes, pregnancy, and severe physical stress; and fifth, that the methodology employed for cortisol assay affects test results. The expert panel concluded (41) that "the DST is a useful research tool, but at this time there are no clear indications for its routine use in the diagnosis or clinical management of depression." Its premature introduction into clinical practice indicates an eagerness to identify psychiatry with the rest of medicine, one that has far outrun critical judgement.
I am not a Luddite. I welcome the appropriate use of appropriate technology. To disdain useful drugs because of a faith in psychotherapy as the philosopher's stone for transmuting dross into gold is as irrational as to rely on drugs excessively in ignorance of their limitations. Yet, today there are zealots who worship at the shrine of biological psychiatry just as blindly as an early generation venerated the Freudian corpus as the revealed truth.
A Thought Experiment
Perhaps I can best make my point by choosing this as the moment to unveil my own heretofore secret Gedanken experiment, research undertaken with the patriotic motive to make psychiatry competitive with other technology-based disciplines. You are familiar with positron emission tomography (PET) and nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR). My goal had been the development of a PETjNMR cephaloscope. Once operational, this instrument was to be placed in one external auditory canal of the patient while the psychiatric operator looked into the other through a modified otoscope. By appropriate transduction of the beams of energy passing through the cerebral matter between the ears, the readout on the instrument would enable the psychiatrist to assess the state of the pineal, the very organ which neurobiological research by Descartes had identified as the seat of the soul.
As Descartes wrote in 1649 (42) , the pineal "is situated in the middle of the brain substance and so suspended above the duct whereby the animal spirits in its anterior cavities have communication with those in its posterior, that the slightest movements which take place in it may alter very greatly the course of these spirits; and reciprocally that the smallest changes which occur in the course of the spirits may do much to change the movements of this gland ... The whole action of the soul consists of this, that solely because it desires something, it causes the gland with which it is closely united to move in the way requisite to produce the effect which relates to this desire."
Because cephaloscopy was to be an office procedure, the psychiatrist rather than the radiologist would have been able to bill for it. Thus, fees could be set at a level to amortize the investment in the instrument. For myself, I intended to ask no profit (other than the tax-free Nobel Prize money). The cephaloscope would be guaranteed to increase the earning capacity of psychiatrists handsomely. Because it would be no longer necessary to inquire ofthe patient about the state of his soul, a notoriously time consuming and uncertain procedure, time savings would be prodigious; productivity would increase; cost-effectiveness would please supply-side and free-market economists. My research on this new instrument was within an ace of a prototype model when I was afflicted by an acute crisis of conscience, in all probability resulting from vertigo of the pineal. I attacked the instrument with an axe; I shredded my data sheets before they could be copied by sinister commercial interests. In the nick of time, I had realized the consequences of my thought experiment. * Once at hand, the PETjNMR cephaloscope, like the endoscope and the cardiac catheter before it, would come to dominate clinical practice through its potential for increasing earnings and its capacity to generate ostensibly objective data. The availability of a technology invested with the authority of science is irresistable to patient and doctor alike in reifying disease. In the process, what is overlooked is that illness is a socially constructed experience.
This fantasy heightens by exaggeration, but I do not believe it misrepresents the impact on technology on the practice of medicine. Let us turn to a more mundane example. The availability of potent neuroleptic drugs, without question an important therapeutic advance in psychiatry, has come to dominate practice. In many public facilities, drugs have become the principal, even the sole treatment modality because they are relatively inexpensive. Psychoanalysts now find it fashionable to recall that a worried Freud, himself a product of 19th century reductionism, warned 70 years ago (43):
"We must recollect that all our provisional ideas in psychology will some day be based on an organic substructure ... We take this probability into account when we substitute special forces in the mind for special chemical substances." Do these developments represent sound practice or sound theory? (45) . Thus, the appropriate use of community resources and of family intervention provides about the same protection against relapse as do drugs. They may be more expensive in the eyes of the budget officer than maintenance phenothiazines, but they do not place patients at risk for drug toxicity, not all of which is reversible. None of this argues against the use of neuroleptics in the management of acute psychoses, where they continue to represent the treatment of choice. But it does indicate that maintenance drug therapy should not be allowed to substitute for effective psychosocial interventions (46) .
Humane care, appropriately termed the "moral treatment of the insane," had been shown to increase the likelihood of recovery long before the psychotropic drugs were discovered (47) . Although short-term prognosis has been transformed by medication, long-term outcome remains contingent on life circumstances, as demonstrated by the WHO International Pilot Study of Schizophrenia (48) . Participating research clinicians established consistent clinical criteria for the diagnosis of schizophrenic patients treated in field research centers in each of nine cooperating countries (Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, India, Nigeria, Taiwan, U.K., U.S. and U.S.S.R.). Yet the clinical course of these patients, despite their common symptomalogy, differed markedly from country to country at 2 and 5 year follow-up evaluations. We might have expected that the best results would be found in the country with the most "modern" psychiatric treatment services. The contrary proved to be true. The outcome for patients in Agra, Cali, and Ibadan (centers of the "less developed" countries) proved to be significantly better than that for those in Aarhus, London, Moscow, Prague, and Washington, the most "advanced" (49) . It remains a task for future research to dissect out the precise sociocultural factors which accountfor this major effect on outcome. The point to be remembered is that exacerbation and remission in chronic psychotic disorders is a function ofsocial context as well as the state of the organism.
Future Needs
The growing prevalence of chronic illness provides the greatest challenge to medical care in the remaining decades of this century. Professor Morton Kramer has highlighted the public health data which point to rising prevalence of mental disorders (50) . Two interacting factors contribute to this situation. The first is the large relative increase in the number of persons in age groups at high risk for these conditions. The second is what Gruenberg (51) has termed "failure of success": the increase in the average duration of chronic disease, which has resulted from the successful application of techniques for arresting fatal complications and prolonging the lives of affected individuals without being able to reverse the disease process itself.
Amidst the current concern about a glut of doctors, clearly true for certain categories of specialists, we must not lose sight of the fact that psychiatrists remain in short supply relative to growing population needs (52) . Without increased recruitment into our field, shortages of trained personnel will almost certainly become a major barrier to the universal provision of care. Agreed, we need better treatment methods than we now possess; for that, more research is needed. Agreed, we need better health care coverage; for that, financing must be arranged. But neither will suffice without the provision of more as well as better trained mental health personnel, personnel alert to the psychosocial as well as the biological factors in psychiatric disorders and skillful in delivering comprehensive care for persons in distress.
sommes qui pourront servir ad'autres projets de sante.
La technologie en est venue a dominer l'approche medicale et elle a cree des obstables conceptuels a la prestation de soins medicaux adequats. Les medecins doivent s'occuper du malade, tant du point de vue de l'experience meme de la maladie que de celui des organes ou des tissus malades. L'auteur illustre dans cet article les limites du modele biomedical en psychiatrie au moyen d'un instrument hypothetique: Ie PET/ NM R cephaloscope. L'experience clinique demontre clairement que la famille et Iemilieu culturel sont desfacteurs determinants de l'etat du malade, meme dans les maladies comportant un element organique important.
